Publications

During the COVID-19 pandemic, different policies were implemented to increase vaccination uptake. Meanwhile, conspiracy theories spread widely, and vaccinated versus unvaccinated people increasingly polarized against each other. This study examined the associations between perceived vaccination coercion, conspiracy beliefs and polarization. We tested the relationship of vaccination status with perceived vaccination coercion, conspiracy beliefs, and polarization, with a total sample size of N = 1202 (n = 400 in China, n = 401 in the US, and n = 401 in the UK), among them n = 603 were vaccinated and n = 599 were unvaccinated. As pre-registered, unvaccinated people perceived more vaccination coercion and endorsed more conspiracy theories. Conspiracy mentality was positively related to perceived coercion. Contrary to our hypotheses, vaccinated people were more polarized toward unvaccinated people than vice versa. Finally, conspiracy beliefs mediated the link between perceived coercion and polarization among unvaccinated people.

Conspiracy beliefs have been studied mostly through cross-sectional designs. We conducted a five-wave longitudinal study (N = 376; two waves before and three waves after the 2020 American presidential elections) to examine if the election results influenced specific conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy mentality, and whether effects differ between election winners (i.e., Biden voters) versus losers (i.e., Trump voters) at the individual level. Results revealed that conspiracy mentality kept unchanged over 2 months, providing first evidence that this indeed is a relatively stable trait. Specific conspiracy beliefs (outgroup and ingroup conspiracy beliefs) did change over time, however. In terms of group-level change, outgroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time for Biden voters but increased for Trump voters. Ingroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time across all voters, although those of Trump voters decreased faster. These findings illuminate how specific conspiracy beliefs are, and conspiracy mentality is not, influenced by an election event.

The current prospective risk assessment study evaluated the application of the Chinese translation of the Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20 Version 3 (HCR-20^V3) in a sample of 152 offenders with mental disorders and civil psychiatric patients. The ratings of the presence and relevance of risk factors were compared, as well as summary risk ratings (SRRs), both across offenders and civil psychiatric patients, and across male and female sub-samples. Interrater reliability was consistently “excellent” for the presence and relevance of risk factors and for SRRs. Concurrent validity analyses indicated that HCR-20^V3 was strongly correlated with Violence Risk Scale (from r = 0.53 to 0.71). The results of predictive validity analyses provided strong support for the bivariate associations between the main indices of HCR-20 ^V3 and violence within 6 weeks, 7–24 weeks, and 6 months; SRRs added incrementally to both relevance and presence ratings across three follow-up lengths.

Many citizens distrust powerful societal institutions, and hold conspiracy theories about them. What are the implications of this suspicion of institutions for people’s social relationships? The current paper proposes that institutions have at least two functions to regulate citizens’ social relationships: providing people with a sense of safety, and providing models for group norms and values. Suspicion of institutions undermines both of these functions, and therefore yields a range of negative societal outcomes by impacting people’s interpersonal, within-group, and between-group relationships. More specifically, suspicion of institutions reduces trust between strangers, within-group cooperation, commitment, and prosocial behavior, and increases prejudice, intergroup conflict, polarization, and extremism. We conclude that institutional distrust and conspiracy theories erode the fabric of society.